Another uncertainty involved the question of the appropriate rate of growth of the monetary aggre gates. Some analysts viewed the downturn in output to be the result of supply constraints, and concluded that, in view of the accelerating rate of inflation, a slower rate of growth of money was appropriate. Other analysts held the view that the cause of the decline in real output was inadequate aggregate de mand, and thereby urged more rapid monetary expansion.
Another uncertainty involved the question of the appropriate rate of growth of the monetary aggre gates. Some analysts viewed the downturn in output to be the result of supply constraints, and concluded that, in view of the accelerating rate of inflation, a slower rate of growth of money was appropriate. Other analysts held the view that the cause of the decline in real output was inadequate aggregate de mand, and thereby urged more rapid monetary expansion.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was thus faced with an unusually high degree of un certainty in adopting monetary actions which were considered consistent with the agreed-upon goals for the economy.1 Monetary actions were taken which the Committee considered consistent with long-run objectives for monetary growth. Specific instructions w ere given to the Trading Desk to achieve, over periods of two months, growth of RPDs and the money stock (both M, and M2) within specified ranges, and to maintain the Federal funds rate within specified limits until the subsequent meeting of the Committee.2 Money, however, frequendy did not grow as was planned, which was another problem which plagued the FOMC throughout much of 1974.
This article first reviews forecasts of private and government economists, including the staff of the FOMC, throughout the year and traces the gradual deterioration in the outlook. Next, the question of un certainty regarding the appropriate growth of the money stock is examined. Finally, the uncertainty ' The "Record of Policy Actions", which in 1974 was released to the public usually three months after each FOMC meeting and subsequently published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, contained a brief outline of observed and projected economic conditions as well as a description of the monetary actions taken by the FOMC. 2Mi is demand deposits and currency held by the nonbank public. Mo is Mi plus net time deposits. Because of the dis continuities of the series, reserves available to support private nonbank deposits ( RPDs) are omitted from the discussion presented here.
regarding the response of the money stock to policy actions is discussed.
UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE STATE AND DIRECTION OF THE ECONOMY

Initial Predictions
In the closing days of 1973, forecasters were hedg ing their predictions more than usual because of the uncertain impact of the oil embargo and the asso ciated "energy crisis." Most economists believed that the U. S. economy would grow more slowly in 1974 than it did in 1973, with most of the rise in gross national product (GNP) accounted for by prices rather than output. This was the concensus among the eleven economists assembled by the Conference Board late in 1973, and was typical of the forecasts of other leading economists.
The Committee met regularly once each month during 19 7 4 to discuss economic trends and to de cide upon the future course of open market opera tions. As in previous years, occasional telephone or telegram consultations were held between regular meetings. Additional policy actions for subsequent weeks and months were generally discussed at these interim meetings. During each regular meeting, a directive was issued to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York stating the general economic goals of the Committee and providing general guidelines as to how the Manager of the System Open Market A c count1 at the New York Federal Reserve Bank should conduct open market operations to achieve these goals. Each directive contained a short review of economic data considered and the general eco nomic goals sought by the Committee. The last para graph gave operating instructions to the Account Man ager. These instructions were stated in terms of bank reserve and money market conditions which w ere con sidered consistent with the achievement of desired growth rates of m onetary aggregates. A ny special factors, such as Treasury financing operations, were also taken into account. 2Mi refers to the money stock, defined as private demand deposits plus currency in the hands of the nonbank public. M2 refers to money stock plus net time deposits. Net time deposits are defined as total deposits at all commer cial banks minus large time certificates of deposit at large weekly reporting commercial banks. Adjusted credit proxy is defined as member bank deposits subject to reserve requirements plus bank-related commercial paper, Euro dollar borrowings of U. S. banks, and certain other non deposit items.
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ing inflation indicated excessive aggregate demand, and therefore called for less rapid monetary growth. They cited the many shocks to the economy which occurred during the year and in the immediately pre ceding year as factors limiting the output of goods and services.
The January 1974 issue of First National City Bank's Monthly Economic Letter highlighted the con flict faced by policymakers last year: "To prevent inflation from making the slowdown or recession even deeper in this country, the growth of the money stock would have to be accelerated to a rate substantially higher than that of 1973. More rapid monetary expan sion, to be sure, promotes and validates inflation." First National City Bank also pointed out that the task of the Federal Beserve was especially difficult during the cyclical currents that existed then. They con tended that, historically, undue monetary expansion during recessions has proved to be the "ultimate folly." Also, in the short run, a recession caused by supply constraints would probably not respond to rapid growth in the money supply. This conflict of views was evident in the FOMC deliberations. For example, in their dissents to the directive adopted at the February 20 meeting, Gov ernors Bucher and Sheehan and President Morris ". . . expressed concern about current and prospective weakness in aggregate economic demands." On the other hand, President Francis in dissenting ". . . ex pressed the view that the over-all economic situation was stronger than suggested by the staff projections and that inflation remained the major long-term eco nomic problem."
Insufficient-Aggregate-Demand View of Downturn
One group of observers advised that rapid money growth was appropriate last year because their analy ses led them to attribute the downturn to insufficient growth of aggregate demand. A continuing decrease in real money balances, a slower growth in income velocity, and high market interest rates were cited by various analysts as evidence in support of the weakaggregate-demand view.
Real Money Balances Argument -Beal money bal ances (money stock divided by some index of the price level, M/P) decreased in the last half of 1973 and continued to decrease throughout 1974. Some analysts argued that such a decrease had a marked retarding effect on growth of aggregate demand last year. Their argument is as follows: People desire to hold some given level of "real" money balances as part of their asset portfolio. W hen actual real money balances decline, and if there is no change in desired real balances, spending on goods and services w ill be restricted in an attempt to restore real money bal ances to the desired level. Efforts to do so would cause a decline in total spending, output, and, ulti mately, the price level. The proponents of this view argued such was the case in 1973 and 1974.
A decline in real money balances can occur through changes in either the numerator or denominator of this expression: either the growth of nominal money balances slows relative to the rate of change of prices, or the rate of inflation accelerates while growth of the money stock is relatively steady. During most of 1974 the decline in the ratio of the money stock to the price level was due to prices accelerating sharply relative to growth of the money stock. In other periods since W orld W ar II when real money bal ances declined preceding a recession, the money stock was declining or was growing at a rate slower than previously, but prices were relatively stable.
The real balance argument presents a fundamental policy dilemma. On the one hand, in order to avoid a severe economic contraction the monetary authorities should increase the money stock rapidly so as to re store growth in real balances. On the other hand, since the growth of money determines the rate of inflation, an infusion of "unwanted" money would only add fuel to the inflation.3 In essence, the crucial ques tion is whether an observed decline in real balances is the result of a voluntary action on the part of the public.
Income Velocity Argument -Income velocity (nominal GNP divided by the money stock) in 1974 grew at a rate about half that of 1973. A group of analysts argued that given actual money growth, this decline in velocity growth depressed growth of ag gregate demand. This argument is similar to the real money balances one, in which these measures are used as indicators of slackening aggregate demand. Since both measures incorporate prices and money, they often lead to similar conclusions.
Those who advance the velocity argument assert that velocity is a proxy measure for desired money balances. A slower growth of velocity is said to re
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS APRIL 1975
fleet an increase in desired money balances relative to income. It is argued that if the level of actual money balances is constant, but individuals want to increase their holdings of money, they will decrease their spending on goods and services so as to achieve their desired level of money balances.
The slower growth in velocity last year represented, according to proponents of this view, an increase in desired money balances relative to income; thus a more rapid growth in the money supply should have occurred last year if growth of aggregate demand was not to slow down. On the other hand, the slower growth in measured velocity during 1974 may have been a temporary phenomenon resulting from the in creased economic and political uncertainty prevailing in this period. In such a case, a faster growth in money would have led to even greater inflation as velocity returned to its previous trend.
Interest Rate Argument -From mid-March to early July, market interest rates climbed at a steady pace. Then, from midyear through the end of the year, short-term interest rates declined sharply, while long-term interest rates fell very slowly. A large group of economists argued that such a rise in interest rates, particularly long-term rates, represented an overly re strictive monetary policy tending to curtail future ag gregate demand. As a result of this type of analysis, they argued for faster money growth in order to achieve lower interest rates than the levels prevailing during early 1974.
A counter argument is that the rapidly rising long term interest rates in the first half of 1974, and their failure to decline significantly in the last half of the year, was primarily the result of a high and increasing rate of inflation which led to a larger inflation premium in market interest rates. This argument contended that faster money growth would add to the already exces sive rate of inflation and, ultimately, result in even higher interest rates. 
Supply-Constraint View of Downturn
In contrast to those holding the insufficient-aggregate-demand view of the downturn, another group of analysts argued that aggregate demand was strong, as indicated by the accelerating inflation, but there existed many special factors tending to limit produc tion of goods and services last year. This group ar gued that the downturn mainly reflected the influ ence of these supply factors during the first three quarters of the year.
Early in 1974, Chairman Arthur F. Burns pre sented the following analysis to the Joint Economic Committee:
The current economic slowdown, however, does not appear to have the characteristics of a typical business recession. To date, declines in employment and pro duction have been concentrated in specific industries and regions of the country rather than spread broadly over the economy. In some major sectors the demand fo r goods and services is still rising. Capital spending plans of business firms remain strong and so do in ventory demands for the many materials and com ponents in short supply.
Chairman Bums then concluded:
A highly expansive m onetary policy w ould do little to stimulate production and employment; but it w ould run a serious risk of rocking financial markets, of causing the dollar to depreciate in foreign exchange markets, and of intensifying our already dangerous inflationary problem.
At midyear President Darryl R. Francis, in an ad dress to the Steel Plate Fabricators Association, ar gued that . . . the economy is fundam entally very strong and there is more than adequate aggregate demand to promote real expansion. I view the slower growth in real output after the first quarter of 1973 as being attributable to the economy operating 'flat-out' at full capacity in an environment w here price and wage controls severely reduced the efficiency of the m ar ket system in allocating resources in the production process.
I
do not see how the existence of wide-spread shortages of commodities and sharply rising prices can be view ed as characteristics of weak aggregate demand. The sharp drop in real output in the first quarter of this year was clearly the result of the oil boycott and related developments such as the truckers' strike, the allocation program, and the pres ence of controls on both prices and resource m ove ments. Only a few industries w ere affected and all of them w ere energy related. Furthermore, unem ploym ent in the first few months of this year was much smaller than one would have expected if the sharp drop in real output had been widespread and had resulted from fundamental weakness in the economy. 
First Half of 1974
A t the January meeting of the FOMC, a staff analy sis suggested that "growth in the demand for money over the first half of 1974 was likely to be somewhat greater than had been expected earlier." It appeared likely to the Committee that if Mx were to grow at a rate consistent with the longer-run objectives for monetary aggregates,5 money market conditions would tighten somewhat in the period immediately ahead. In response to these observations, the Commit tee adopted ranges of tolerance for growth rates of Mi and M2 over the January-February period of 3 to 6 percent and 6 to 9 percent, respectively. They also decided that "in the period until the next meeting the weekly average Federal funds rate might be per mitted to vary in an orderly fashion from as low as 8% per cent to as high as 10 per cent, if necessary, in the course of operations."
Noting the decline in Mx in January, the Commit tee adopted ranges of tolerance for the FebruaryMarch period which were considerably greater than the ranges set for the January-February period. W hile the Desk was supplying reserves to maintain the Federal funds rate as desired, the money stock was expanding at an extremely rapid rate. During the two months prior to the April FOMC meeting, the money stock expanded at an 11 percent annual rate.8 Also, during the intermeeting period, the prime rate at most large commercial banks rose from 8% percent to 10 percent.
The range of tolerance for Mx for the April-May period was 3 to 7 percent, which was lower than the band set for Mi for the March-April period. The range for M2 was 5 V2 to 8 V2 percent. A one percent age point range was adopted for Federal funds, with the upper limit at 10% percent. "The longer-run growth rate for Mx accepted by the Committee was revised upward slightly.. 
Policy Consensus
In light of the fo re go in g developments, it is the policy of the Federal O pen Market Com mittee to foster financial conditions conducive to resisting inflationary pressures, cushioning the effects on production and employment gro w in g out of the oil shortage, and m ain taining equilibrium in the country's balance of payments.
O perating Instructions
To implement this policy, while taking account of the forthcoming Treasury financing and of international and domestic financial market developments, the Committee seeks to achieve bank reserve and money market con ditions consistent with moderate growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead. . . . while taking account of developments in domestic and international financial markets, the Committee seeks to maintain about the prevailing restrictive money market conditions, provided that the monetary aggregates appear to be grow ing at rates within the specified ranges of tolerance.
Dissents
. . while taking account of developments in domestic and international financial markets, the Committee seeks to maintain about the prevailing restrictive money market conditions, provided that the monetary aggregates appear to be grow ing at rates within the specified ranges of tolerance.
Mr. C la y dissented from this action because he thought that for too long the Committee had accepted rates of growth in the monetary aggregates that would result in a continuing and grow ing inflation.
Absent and not voting: Mr. Hayes. (M r. Debs voted as alternate for Mr. Hayes.)
. . while taking account of the forthcoming Treasury refunding and of developments in domestic and inter national financial markets, the Committee seeks to achieve bank reserve and money market conditions that would moderate growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead.
. . . Mr. Bucher said he favored maintaining a g e n erally restrictive policy stance in order to combat inflation. However, he thought that that longer-run objective would be best served by seeking in the short run to maintain growth in the monetary aggregates at recent rates; in his view, further efforts to moderate monetary growth at this point would involve an un duly high risk of creating economic conditions that w ould necessitate a marked relaxation of policy.
Absent and not voting: Mr. Brimmer.
A ugust 20 N O C H A N G E . . . while taking account of developments in domestic and international financial markets, the Committee seeks to achieve bank reserve and money market conditions consistent with moderate growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead.
N O N E
. . while taking account of developments in domestic and international financial markets, the Committee seeks to achieve bank reserve and money market conditions consistent with moderate growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead.
Mr. Hayes . . . observed that inflation and inflationary expectations continued unabated whereas the prob abilities, in his view, were against the development of a severe recession.
. . while taking account of the forthcoming Treasury financing and of developments in domestic and inter national financial markets, the Committee seeks to achieve bank reserve and m oney market conditions consistent with resumption of moderate growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead.
Mr. C lay . . . expressed the opinion that the recent shortfalls in growth of M i were not due entirely to the weakness in economic activity but were, at least in part, a lagge d response to the high levels of short-term interest rates prevailing in the spring.
Novem ber 19 N O C H A N G E . . . while taking account of developments in domestic and international financial markets, the Committee seeks to achieve bank reserve and money market conditions consistent with moderate growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead.
N O N E December . . . to foster financial conditions conducive 1 6 -1 7 to resisting inflationary pressures, cushioning recessionary tendencies and encouraging re sumption of real economic growth, and achiev ing equilibrium in the country's balance of payments.
. . . while taking account of developments in domestic and international financial markets, the Committee seeks to achieve bank reserve and money market conditions consistent with somewhat more rapid growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead than has occurred in recent months. of the ranges that had been specified by the Commit tee." During late April the rate at which Federal funds were trading seemed likely to exceed the range set at the April meeting and the System Account Manager reported that "in order to bring the funds rate back within the range of tolerance he would have to expand reserve-supplying operations, thus stimulat ing further growth of the monetary aggregates."
On April 24, in view of the continued pressure in the money market, and given the increase in the dis count rate announced that day by many Reserve Banks, a majority of the Committee concurred in the Chairman's recommendation to raise the upper limit of the Federal funds constraint Vi percentage point to 11 percent. Then, on May 17 "Chairman Burns recom mended that the Committee take note of the difficul ties faced by the System Account Manager in recent days and, in view of the likelihood that those condi tions would persist over the next few days, that it change the ceiling guideline for the funds rate from 11 to UV* per cent."
Between the April and May FOMC meetings, the prime bank loan rate increased 6 times, rising from 10 to 11.5 percent. Interest rates on commercial paper and large CDs also rose substantially during the inter meeting period. The steady rise in interest rates, which began in late February, continued despite an increase in the money stock at an 8.7 percent annual rate in the three months immediately preceding the May meeting.7 Member bank borrowings increased almost $1.5 billion in the two weeks prior to the May meeting.8
The Federal funds constraint adopted at the May meeting permitted only a one-half of one percentage point variance. The Committee "decided that -in view of the sensitive state of financial markets and the considerable tightening in money market conditions that had occurred over recent months -greater em phasis than usual should be placed on money market conditions during the period until the next meeting » A staff analysis at the May meeting suggested that "the maintenance of prevailing money market condi- tions would be associated with a dampening in the rate of growth of money because the demand for money was likely to be restrained by the lagged ef fects of the sharp rise in short-term market rates of interest" that had occurred recently. The Federal funds range was widened to % percentage point on June 10, as the upper limit was raised to 11% percent.
At the June meeting, the staff observed that the existing money market conditions "would be associ ated with some slowing in the rate of growth of the narrowly defined money stock over the months ahead, because the demand for money was likely to be re strained by the lagged effects of the rise in short-term market rates of interest that had occurred over the past few months." In view of these conditions the Federal funds rate was allowed to vary between IV/* percent and 1214 percent in the period until the next meeting. The ranges of tolerance adopted for Mi and M2 for the June-July period were 3% to 7% percent and 5Vz to 8 V2 percent, respectively. achieving both the Federal funds rate and money growth targets. The error in May in the aggregates was very slight, especially when the four data revi sions during the year are considered. Also during May, the Federal funds rate slightly exceeded its range. The notable error in achieving the Federal funds target came in late June and early July, but the Committee tolerated this deviation. In a telephone consultation on July 5 the Committee noted the Man agers report that ". . . the high level of the funds rate was a reflection of the great uncertainty prevailing in both domestic and foreign financial markets, com pounded by the effects of market transactions related to the midyear statement date for banks and by the July 4 holiday. In view of the likelihood that the high level of the rate was primarily a consequence of tech nical factors that might well prove temporary, the Committee concluded that there was no immediate need to press hard to bring the funds rate down within the specified range of tolerance."
Second Half of 1974
Chairman Arthur Bums commented before the Joint Economic Committee in early August that "clearly, the American economy is not being starved for funds. On the contrary, growth of money and credit is still proceeding at a faster rate than is con sistent with general price stability over the longer term." Based on current data, the growth of the money stock was at a 10.9 percent annual rate during June. According to the "Record of Policy Actions" a major part of the step-up was attributable to a temporary increase in foreign official deposits arising from pay ments to oil exporters.9
At the August meeting, "a staff analysis suggested that the unusually slow pace of monetary growth in July was not likely to persist in view of the continued sizable rate of growth in prospect for nominal GNP; in fact, data available for early August indicated that some strengthening had occurred already." The range of tolerance for Mj and M2 was only 2 percentage points for the August-September period, compared with the 4 percentage point spread for M, during the July-August period.
The Board of Governors announced on September 4 the removal of its 3 percent marginal reserve re quirement on certificates of deposit in denominations of $100,000 or more with maturities of four months or 9As stated, this statement implies that domestically-owned U. S. demand deposits did not simultaneously decline as a result of the transactions with foreign oil producers.
longer. The action reduced the volume of required reserves by about $400 million.
Although many of the economists at the W hite House Summit Conference in early September called for monetary ease, Edwin L. Dale, Jr., of the New York Times reported that "high Federal Reserve offi cials have gone out of their w ay to point out, for the first time, that the Reserve's highly restrictive monetary policy has already been eased to a significant degree, and they add that no 'substantial' further easing is to be expected." The money stock grew at a 1.5 percent annual rate from June to August compared to the 6.7 percent growth in the first half of the year. The ranges for Mi and M2 were 3 and 2% percentage points wide, respectively, for the September-October period. The Federal funds range established at the September meeting was less than the range established at the August meeting.
At the October meeting the one-month range of tolerance for the Federal funds rate was lowered considerably, and the October-November ranges for M, and M2 were somewhat higher than the ranges set for the September-October period. In November the two-month ranges of tolerance for the aggregates were somewhat higher than they were in October. Throughout the last three months of 1974, the onemonth range of tolerance for the Federal funds rate was reduced.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR MONEY DEVIATIONS
The growth rates of both Mi and M2 were within the desired ranges in only one month during the second half of the year. The Federal funds rate, how ever, followed closely the ranges established at each meeting (see accompanying charts).
There are two alternative, but not necessarily in consistent, reasons for the frequent failure of the growth rates of M, and M2 to be within their specified ranges last year. One reason was the complication of having a Federal funds constraint as well as a mone tary aggregate growth target. The other was an un anticipated change in the relationship of the growth of Mi and M2 to growth of the monetary base.
Federal Funds Rate Constraint
The problem created by having specified ranges of tolerance for both the monetary aggregates and the Federal funds rate is illustrated in Figure I . Line I represents a hypothetical projected relationship be
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tween the Federal funds rate and the associated rate of change in money made by the FOMC staff and considered in the Committee's deliberations.10 This relationship is based mainly on a projection of growth of GNP. According to the relationship, given the projected growth of GNP, the level of the Fed eral funds rate and the growth of money are inversely related.
For illustration, assume that the consensus of the meeting is that a Federal funds rate between 6 and 7 percent w ill be sought. According to the projected relationship this implies that the growth of money during the two-month interval w ill be between 5 and 8 percent. Assuming that such a range of money growth is deemed acceptable, open market opera tions which maintain the Federal funds rate within its range would be expected to result in money growth within its range of tolerance.
A problem associated with this approach is that the projected relationship between alternative Federal funds rates and associated growth rates of money (Line I) is not known with certainty. Suppose that the actual growth of GNP is not as high as projected, and that the actual growth would yield a set of rela tionships represented by Line II. If such were the case, adherence to the 6 percent lower limit for the Federal funds rate would be expected to result in only a 2 percent rate of money growth -3 percentage points below its lower range of tolerance. Or, adher ence to the 5 percent lower limit for growth in money would be expected to result in a 5 percent Federal funds rate, which is less than its lower limit of toler ance. In such a situation, a choice must be made re garding which range of tolerance is to be achieved.
The existence of such a situation, as depicted in Figure I , may account in part for the failure of money growth rates to be within their ranges of tolerance in the second half of 1974. Most forecasters did not project the decrease in the rate of growth of GNP, with the result that a wrong projection would be made of the money market relationships. Consequently, a choice had to be made regarding which of the two ranges of tolerance was to be achieved. A dollar increase in the monetary base that is matched by a dollar increase in currency also increases the money stock (currency plus demand deposits), but only by one dollar. An increase in currency creates no multiple expansion between monetary base and the money stock. To the extent that the extraordinary increases in currency and the resulting fall in the multiplier were unanticipated last year, growth of money was less than one would have expected.
Data Revision
A purely technical uncertainty regarding growth of the money stock also occurred last year. This uncer tainty stems from the fact that data on the money stock were revised four times during 1974. Policy makers took actions based on the reported growth of the money stock, but later revisions in the data may have indicated different conclusions than preliminary figures. One major source of revision in the data on the money stock is that actual nonmember bank data are available only four times a year, and must be estimated during the remainder of the year. In the first half of last year Mj increased at a 6.7 percent rate and M2 at a 9.3 percent rate. The Fed eral funds rate increased during the same period from 9.65 percent in January to 11.93 percent in June, on a monthly average basis. The growth of the monetary aggregates and the rise in the Federal funds rate were almost consistently within the ranges of toler ance specified by the FOMC.
In the second half of 1974, the rates of growth for Mx and M2 were 3.9 and 6.5 percent, respectively. The Federal funds rate fell from 11.93 percent in June to an average of 8.53 percent in December. The growth rates of the monetary aggregates were, for the most part, well below the FOMC two-month ranges of tolerance, while the Federal funds rate again was almost always within the specified ranges. Suppose, for example, there is an autonomous in crease in the money supply of country j, which leads to an increase in the demand for goods, services, and securities in that country. Under a system of fixed ex change rates, any such increase in domestic demand w ill result in a tendency for prices of domestic real and financial assets in country j to rise, in the short run, relative to those in foreign markets. Economic units in country j w ill react by decreasing their de mands for domestic real and financial assets in favor of foreign assets while domestic suppliers of these 
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assets will seek to sell more at home and less abroad. A t the same time, foreign economic units w ill decrease their demands for the assets of country j and foreign suppliers will attempt to sell more of their own assets in country j. All of these factors work in favor of an increase in imports and a decrease in exports in country j. The resultant deterioration of the BOP re flects the exchange of money balances for real and financial assets by economic units of country j. The foreign recipients of these money balances will con vert them into their own currencies at their respective central banks. These foreign central banks will then present the balances to the central bank in country j in return for international reserves. Since international reserves are one of the components of a country's monetary base4, the effect of this transaction will be a decrease in the money supply of country j towards its level prior to the autonomous increase and an increase in the money supplies of its surplus trading partners.
Under a system of freely floating exchange rates, the required adjustment of money balances is ac complished through movements in the exchange rate. Under such a system the BOP (on a money account basis) equals zero by definition and there are no intercountry movements of international reserves. As such, required adjustments in money balances cannot be accommodated through balance-of-payments flows. In this case the adjustment of actual money balances to their desired levels is accomplished by changes in domestic prices and exchange rates (which change concomitantly with and accommodate the required movement in domestic price levels).
The above approach is in sharp contrast with what amounts to the current conventional wisdom of pay ments theory; namely, the elasticities and absorption approaches. Implicit in both of these approaches is the assumption that either there are no monetary consequences associated with the BOP, or that to the extent the potential for such consequences exists, they can be and are absorbed (sterilized) by domestic monetary authorities.5 The MBOP regards all BOP deficits and surpluses and movements in floating exchange rates as phases in a stock adjustment which are the result of a dis parity between the demand for and supply of money. This approach asserts that, under a system of fixed exchange rates, there are inflows (outflows) of inter national reserves associated with BOP surpluses (def icits) and that these flows cannot be sterilized in the long run. Furthermore, because of the impact of these reserve flows on a country's monetary base, they w ill result in variations in the supply of money rela tive to the demand for it and thus have an equili brating impact on the level of money balances and the BOP. According to this view, the only w ay to obtain persistent deficits or surpluses is to construct a model in which the need for stock adjustments is being continuously recreated.
The only solutions to these reserve flows are proc esses which facilitate the return of actual money bal ances to their desired levels. This adjustment can be accomplished either automatically, through inflows or outflows of international reserves, or through ap propriate actions by the domestic monetary authorities which change some other component of the monetary base by the same amount. Under a system of freely floating exchange rates the adjustment is also ac complished either automatically by changes in domes tic price levels and the concomitant changes in the exchange rate, or again by the appropriate actions on the part of the monetary authorities. The only other potentially successful policy actions available are those which, in the end, have the same effect on money balances as those just mentioned.
Some Fundamental Propositions
In order to facilitate the development of a model later in this article, there are some fundamental prop ositions associated with the MBOP that should be discussed.
1)
The MBOP maintains that the transactions re corded in the balance of payments are essentially a reflection of monetary phenomena. As such, it places emphasis on the direct influence of an excess demand for or supply of money on the BOP. 
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of a limited number of variables. The MBOP does not imply that changes in the money supply are the only factors which affect the BOP. It nevertheless does say that the primary channel by which changes in any real variable affect the BOP is through their effects on the demand for or supply of money.8 Thus, any analysis of the impact of a policy or other change must begin with an analysis of how this change generates a divergence between actual and desired money bal ances or affects such a divergence that already exists.
2)
In the analysis presented in this article, the crucial BOP concept is that which captures all trans actions reflecting the adjustment of actual money balances to their desired levels. That is, the only transactions considered below the line are those which have an influence on domestic and foreign monetary bases and thus on domestic and foreign money supplies.7
The analysis presented here does not attempt to provide a theory of the individual subaccounts; it merely lumps the individual components ( goods, serv ices, transfers, short-and long-term capital) into a single category -"items above the line." This ap proach recognizes that an excess supply of or demand for money may be cleared through the markets for either goods, services, or securities.8 Furthermore, if the BOP is viewed within this framework, the pitfalls of placing emphasis on any particular subaccount are obvious. For example, the effects on aggregate eco nomic activity of a deficit in the merchandise trade account could be neutralized by a surplus in one of the capital accounts. In this case, any negative aggregate demand effects resulting from an increase in imports of goods would be offset by an inflow of capital and thus an increase in investment demand. The two ef°F fects would offset each other and aggregate money balances would be unchanged.
3) The MBOP relies on the assumption of an ef ficient world market for goods, services, and securi ties.9 Under a system of fixed exchange rates, the price of any good or service in one country relative to its price in any other country can change only in the short run. Likewise, the rate of return on any asset can differ from the rate of return on assets of comparable risk and maturity in any other country only in the short run. It follows that in the long run price levels and interest rates in all countries must move rigidly in line with one another. In fact, in a fixed exchange rate regime it is the attempts to arbi trage intercountry price and interest rate differentials that are the driving force leading to the reduction or accumulation of money balances and a concomitant temporary BOP deficit or surplus.
Under a system of freely floating exchange rates, price levels may move at different rates between countries. However, the impact of these differential rates of change on individual relative prices between countries is offset by opposite movements in exchange rates. The same arbitrage opportunities that lead to reserve flows under fixed rates lead to exchange rate adjustments that exactly compensate for differential price level changes between countries.
4) The MBOP is a theory of an automatic adjust ment process. According to this theory, any BOP dis equilibrium or exchange rate movement reflects a dis parity between actual and desired money balances and w ill automatically correct itself. W hile the adjust ment process is different under different exchange rate regimes, the implication is that the process is automatic and that its effects cannot be neutralized in the long run. Any BOP imbalance or exchange rate change is a phase in the automatic adjustment process and attempts to counter these processes merely in crease the forces which give rise to the adjustment ultimately required for a return to equilibrium.
5) The MBOP is concerned primarily w ith the long run. The approach recognizes that short-run analysis is often complicated by the fact that the postulated adjustment behavior is incomplete in the short run. For example, the adjustment of actual 9While it is acknowledged that there are some goods that are not traded internationally, there are limits to relative price changes between these non-traded goods and other (traded) goods. The higher the elasticities of substitution between these two classes of goods in both production and con sumption, the smaller the scope for relative price changes and the more direct the international price interdependence.
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money balances to their desired levels does not occur instantaneously, but rather requires the passage of time. As another example, it is possible that the monetary authorities may attempt to neutralize the impact of international reserve flows on their respec tive money supplies in the short run.10 However, the MBOP asserts that governments cannot follow such policies in the long run. This seems reasonable be cause, in the long run, success in neutralizing the effects of international reserve flows implies that the governments of some (surplus) countries are willing to trade investment and consumption goods for foreign currency balances. The accumulation of these balances by surplus country governments represents a nonmarket induced transfer of wealth away from domestic to foreign consumers. For whatever reason, it is unrealistic to suppose that a government would pursue such policies in the long run.
6)
An implication of this theory is that, under a system of fixed exchange rates, domestic monetary policy does not control a country's money supply. Ex cessive monetary expansion (contraction), via expan sion (contraction) of some controllable component of the monetary base, will result in an outflow (inflow) of international reserves (an uncontrollable compon ent of the monetary base) and a tendency for the money supply to return to its former level.11 The re sulting BOP deficit (surplus) is only a reflection of these uncontrollable international reserve outflows (in flows). Through this process, the inflationary or defla tionary impact of domestic monetary policy is miti gated with respect to the domestic economy and is imposed on the rest of the world via inter-country flows of international reserves. At the same time, however, the domestic economy is subject to the in fluence of inflationary or deflationary monetary ac tions taken in other countries.
Under a system of freely floating exchange rates, the domestic monetary authorities retain dominant control over the money supply, while the interaction of domestic and foreign monetary policies deter mines the exchange rate rather than the BOP (which is now zero by definition). In this case, a country neither imports nor exports international reserves. As a result, the domestic economy is subjected to the full consequences of inflationary or deflationary domestic monetary policies and is insulated from the effects of monetary actions taken in other countries.
7)
Another feature of the MBOP is that it provides a framework within which one is able to assess the differential impact of monetary disturbances which occur in a world in which there is at least one re serve currency country (R C C ) as opposed to those occurring in a world with no RCCs. An RCC is a country whose currency is held by others as a form of international reserves. It is this special status afforded to the currency of the RCC which leads to a slightly altered adjustment process for the world and the RCC itself.
The Special Case of a Reserve Currency Country
Because international reserves and reserve curren cies exist only under a system of fixed exchange rates, the following analysis applies only to that case. For all non-RCCs, expansionary (contractionary) mone tary policies are offset by a BOP deficit ( surplus) and the resulting contraction (expansion) of the interna tional reserve component of the monetary base. How ever, for an RCC this need not be the case. An ex pansionary (contractionary) monetary policy in the RCC may have no effect on its BOP as defined in this article. However, the RCC's trading partners w ill al ways experience a BOP surplus ( deficit) and an inflow (outflow) of international reserves as a result of such RCC policies.12 The reason for this is that the RCC currency is held by foreign central banks as a form of international reserves. W hile non-RCC monetary au thorities are not willing to accumulate large balances denominated in other non-RCC currencies, they are willing to accumulate large balances denominated in the RCC currency. Because these balances are them selves a type of international reserves, non-RCC mon etary authorities may not be inclined to present them to the RCC authorities in exchange for other inter national reserves.
However, to the extent that the RCC loses no inter national reserves as a result of an increase in other components of its monetary base, it does experience an accumulation of liquid liabilities to foreign official holders.13 As these liabilities of the RCC are re 12Recall that the BOP concept used in this article is the bal ance in the money account. That is, the only items re corded below the line are those that affect the domestic money supply. 13 While the accumulations or reductions of the holdings of liabilities do not affect the RCC balance of payments as defined in this article, they do affect some RCC balance-of-
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garded as assets by foreign official holders, their ac cumulation represents an inflow of international re serves and a BOP surplus for RCC trading partners.
The how and w hy of all of this can be brought out by reference to the balance sheets of the world's mone tary authorities. W hile the following analysis applies to the case of expansionary monetary policy in the RCC, it is equally applicable, to the analysis of con tractionary monetary policy. In addition, in order to simplify the analysis we w ill assume that foreign central banks invest all of their RCC currency hold ings in government securities issued by the RCC. However, we fully recognize that this need not be the case. Non-RCC central banks can and frequently do invest their RCC currency holdings in other assets or simply allow them to accumulate as deposits at the RCC central bank. W hatever the non-RCC authori ties decide to do, however, all that is crucial for our analysis to hold is that they do not accumulate de posits at the RCC central bank. Since the non-RCCs view these reserve currency balances as R, they are willing to accumulate them in the same manner that they accumulate other R. However, these R differ from others in one significant aspect -namely, they can be invested in government securities issued by the RCC. W hen non-RCCs choose to do this, the effects are as illustrated in tier (C ). 
The net effect of all of this is that the monetary bases of all countries have increased ( as shown in the NET tier).
In view of the above analysis, a world in which there exists at least one RCC differs significantly from a world in which there are no RCCs. In a world with RCCs, BOP deficits and surpluses may by themselves decrease and increase the level of R in the world and in individual countries. In a world with no RCCs, BOP deficits and surpluses result in a redistribution of an existing stock of R among countries, but pro duce no change in the overall level. As a result, in a world with RCCs, the world and each individual non-RCC will ordinarily experience much more dif ficulty in controlling its money supply. Thus, the existence of RCCs compounds the problems of money stock control which are already inherent in any sys tem of fixed exchange rates.
In addition, this analysis implies that the inflation ary or deflationary impact of RCC monetary policy is spread over the entire world. Unlike the case of a non-RCC, however, there may be no mitigation of the
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impact on the domestic economy since the RCC may neither gain nor lose reserves. As a result, prices in the RCC could change by the same amount as they would under a system of freely floating exchange rates. W hat's worse, however, is that the rest of the world will gain or lose international reserves and bear the same price level impact as the RCC. Thus, the potential for large BOP surpluses and deficits and for world wide inflations and deflations are greater under a fixed exchange rate system with RCCs than under any other system considered in this article.
A Monetary Model of the Balance of Payments
Now that the essential features of the MBOP have been spelled out, let us turn to the derivation of a model in which these features are expressed by a set of equations.14 First, the model is derived for a non-RCC under a system of fixed exchange rates. Second, the same model is applied to the case of an RCC under fixed exchange rates. Finally, the model is applied to the case of freely floating exchange rates.
The common elements in each of these models are stable money demand and money supply functions.15 The money supply function for each country may be stated as The demand for money in each country is assumed to be a function of real income, the nominal rate of in terest, and prices. In accordance with the general monetarist frame work of the model, country j is in equilibrium if and only if the growth of the supply of money equals the growth of the demand for money. W e are able to specify the conditions necessary for fulfilling this re quirement by expressing equations (1 ) and (2 ) in terms of rates of change and then equating the result ing expressions. This procedure allows us to derive an expression for the rate of growth of international reserves in country j.17 2) the rate of growth of real income in the RCC relative to a weighted average of the rates of growth of real income in all countries.
Freely Floating Exchange Rates
For the case of freely floating exchange rates, two modifications of the model are necessary. First, the model must be adapted to reflect the fact that there are no international reserve flows, so that the growth rate of a country's money supply is determined solely by do mestic monetary policy [gDj]-Second, the money demand function must be modified to reflect the fact that the rate of price level change in one country may differ from the rate prevailing in the rest of the world.
20For the United States this BOP concept closely resembles the balance on liabilities to foreign official holders. However, this account is distinctly different from the BOP concept utilized in equation (5). Equation (5) explains the balance in the money account, whereas the BOP concept used in equation (6) has no relation to the money supply.
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Upon incorporating both of these modifications into the model, we are able to derive an expression for the determination of movements in the exchange rate. This expression states that the exchange value of currency j in terms of foreign currencies is determined by the rate of growth of the money supply and real income in country j relative to the rate of growth of the money supply and real income respectively in the rest of the world. As such, it implies that cur rency depreciations are the result of excessive mone tary growth. It therefore supports the proposition that inflation causes depreciation of the domestic cur rency rather than vice versa.
Summary and Conclusions
The MBOP may be summarized by the proposition that the transactions recorded in balance-of-payments statistics reflect aggregate portfolio decisions by both foreign and domestic economic units. The framework presented in this article suggests some important pol icy considerations that cannot be addressed within the framework which characterizes most of the cur rently accepted body of payments theory.
The analysis presented here casts the balance of payments in the role of an automatic adjustment mechanism. Balance-of-payments deficits and sur pluses, or movements in freely floating exchange rates, are viewed as being simultaneously both the result of a divergence between actual and desired money bal ances and a mechanism by which such a divergence is corrected. As such, persistent balance-of-payments deficits (surpluses) or depreciations (appreciations) of the foreign exchange value of a currency reflect a continual re-creation of a situation in which excessive monetary expansion in the country in question is greater (less) than the worldwide average. Further more, the only solution to such international distur bances are policies which facilitate the equalization of actual and desired money balances.
The futility of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade which attempt to alter balance-of-payments flows or exchange rate movements becomes readily apparent when one views them within the framework presented above. Suppose, for example, that an import tariff is imposed with the aim of reducing a balance-of-payments deficit in the money account. According to the MBOP, international reserve flows will assure that the balance-of-payments deficit disappears in the long run whether the tariff is imposed or not. That is, even if the tariff were not imposed, the excess money bal ances, and therefore the deficit, would disappear as a result of the outflow of international reserves. How ever, if the tariff is imposed, relative prices will be artificially altered from the levels consistent with the most efficient allocation of resources and maximum gains from trade. Furthermore, the situation is no better if the tariff is imposed in retaliation against restrictive trade practices on the part of other nations. In this case, all that the tariff accomplishes is to further distort relative prices and further reduce the w elfare of all nations.
Another advantage of the MBOP is that it enables one to clearly evaluate the relative desirability of dif ferent exchange rate regimes in terms of their promo tion of autonomy of domestic monetary policy and domestic as well as worldwide price stability. Under a system of freely floating exchange rates a country retains dominant control over its money growth, incurs the full consequences of its domestic monetary policy, and is not subject to the effects of inflationary or deflationary monetary policies undertaken in other countries. Under a system of fixed exchange rates in a world in which there are no reserve currency coun tries, a country loses control of its rate of money growth, has the domestic impact of its monetary pol icy mitigated, and is subject to the effects of monetary policies pursued by other countries. Under a system of fixed exchange rates in a world in which there is at least one reserve currency country, we have the potential for the worst of both of the above systems. W hile the impact of expansionary (contractionary) monetary policies in the reserve currency country is imposed on the rest of the world, there may be no mitigation of their domestic impact. As a result, the entire world is prone towards large changes in its money supply which are initiated by actions taken in the reserve currency country. This conclusion ap pears to be consistent with the inflationary experiences of the western world which began in the late 1960s. This point is especially significant in view of the large merchandise trade deficits that many oil con suming countries have been experiencing. The an alysis presented in this article indicates that the im pact of these deficits on money balances, and there fore on aggregate economic activity in the deficit countries, will be substantially reduced as a result of large inflows of capital from OPEC members. Of course this does not mean that oil consuming coun tries are no worse off now than they were prior to the fourfold increase in oil prices. The MBOP merely states that the impact on GNP will be mitigated through subsequent inflows of capital. The distribu tion of a given GNP between the residents of oil consuming and oil producing countries however, is altered in favor of the oil producers. Table I .
Revision of the Monetary
The main purpose of the reserve adjustment magni tude is to take account of changes in reserve require ment ratios. Total reserves of the banking system are not changed when reserve requirement ratios are changed. However, the amount of deposits that can be supported by a given amount of total reserves is changed. This is taken into account by a change in the reserve adjustment magnitude, and hence the monetary base. For example, when reserve require ment ratios are lowered, the amount of deposits that the amount of total reserves held by the banking sys tem can support is increased, and hence the reserve adjustment magnitude is increased. The reserve ad justment magnitude is changed by the amount of re serves liberated or absorbed by the change in reserve requirement ratios. This amount is estimated by tak ing the change in the average reserve requirement ratio and multiplying it by the deposits in the pe riod immediately preceding the reserve requirement change.
The reserve adjustment magnitude also takes ac count of the effects on required reserves of shifts in the same type of deposits from a bank in one reserve requirement category to a bank in another category. For example, a shift of demand deposits from banks with lower average reserve requirements on demand deposits to banks with higher average reserve require ments on demand deposits w ill lower the reserve adjustment magnitude. The effects on required re serves of shifts in deposits between demand and time deposits are not included in the reserve adjustment magnitude. 
